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Philippe Gautret, Gregory C Gray, Remi N Charrel, Nnanyelugo G Odezulu, Jaff ar A Al-Tawfi q, Alimuddin Zumla, Ziad A Memish
The past decade has seen the emergence of several novel viruses that cause respiratory tract infections in human 
beings, including Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in Saudi Arabia, an H7N9 infl uenza 
A virus in eastern China, a swine-like infl uenza H3N2 variant virus in the USA, and a human adenovirus 14p1 also 
in the USA. MERS-CoV and H7N9 viruses are still a major worldwide public health concern. The pathogenesis and 
mode of transmission of MERS-CoV and H7N9 infl uenza A virus are poorly understood, making it more diffi  cult to 
implement intervention and preventive measures. A united and coordinated global response is needed to tackle 
emerging viruses that can cause fatal respiratory tract infections and to fi ll major gaps in the understanding of the 
epidemiology and transmission dynamics of these viruses.
Introduction
Since the recognition of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) in 2003, several new viruses have 
emerged in diff erent parts of the world. Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was 
fi rst identifi ed in Saudi Arabia and Jordan in 2012, with 
several cases documented in European travellers who 
had visited the Middle East. More than 840 human 
cases of MERS-CoV infection have been confi rmed as 
of July, 2014. Most patients had respiratory disease with 
a range of clinical manifestations from mild, 
asymptomatic cases to severe multisystem illness; 
mortality was about 38%. Human adenovirus 14 
(HAdV14) was fi rst recognised in 1955 and it re-
emerged in 2006 in the USA in a slightly diff erent form 
(HAdV-14p1). Outbreaks have been restricted to the 
USA and China, with cases totalling in the hundreds, 
and mortality has been low. Infl uenza A H7N9 virus 
emerged in eastern China in early 2013 with very few 
cases occurring outside of China. As of June, 2014, 
more than 448 confi rmed human cases have been 
documented with an estimated 39% mortality rate. 
Avian infl uenza A H10N8, the fi rst strain of which was 
isolated from birds several decades ago, emerged in 
2013 to infect at least three people in China, leading to 
one death. Similarly, in 2011 a novel swine-like 
infl uenza H3N2 variant virus emerged in two states in 
the USA, causing disease in 12 people. By the end of 
2013, the virus had spread to ten states and caused at 
least 340 people to be ill (with one death). In this paper, 
we review the epi demiology of these emerging viruses, 
including their geo graphical distribution, modes of 
transmission, and where appropriate their zoonotic 
characteristics.
MERS
Geographical distribution 
MERS-CoV infection is a new human disease that was 
fi rst reported in Saudi Arabia in June, 2012 (fi gure).1 
Retrospective investigation of a hospital outbreak of 
13 cases of respiratory infections in Zarqa, Jordan in 
April, 2012, identifi ed two confi rmed and 11 probable 
cases of which ten were among health-care workers.2 As 
of the end of July, 2014, 841 confi rmed cases, including 
327 deaths (38·4%), have been reported by local 
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Key messages
• Over the past decade, several new viruses causing respiratory tract disease in human 
beings have emerged in diff erent parts of the world.
• Human adenovirus (HAdV) 14p1 has been identifi ed in people only, but Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), infl uenza A H7N9, infl uenza A H10N8, 
and infl uenza A H3N2 variant are zoonotic diseases.
• HAdV14 fi rst recognised in 1955 re-emerged in 2006 in the USA and China.
• As of June, 2014, more than 448 confi rmed human cases of avian Infl uenza A H7N9 
virus infection have been documented since its fi rst discovery in early 2013.
• Infl uenza A H7N9 virus can survive for months in the environment, and the absence of 
clinical signs in poultry, ducks, and wild birds makes it particularly diffi  cult to control.
• An avian infl uenza H10N8 virus has recently emerged in 2013 to infect at least three 
people in China.
• In 2011 a novel swine-like infl uenza A H3N2 variant virus emerged in two states in the 
USA, and by the end of 2013 it had spread to ten states and caused illness in at least 
340 people. The absence of clinical signs among infl uenza A H3N2 variant infected 
pigs is a major concern in that people are essentially serving as sentinels of infection.
• First identifi ed in Saudi Arabia in 2012, the number of human cases of MERS-CoV 
infection have steadily increased to more than 840. Nosocomial transmission to 
patients and health-care workers has been documented.
• While geographically restricted to the Middle East, MERS-CoV is of major public health 
concern since millions of pilgrims from 184 countries visit Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage 
throughout the year.
• There is a mounting evidence suggesting that camels are the likely reservoir of 
MERS-CoV human infections although the precise mode of transmission to humans 
remains unknown.
• A united and coordinated global response is needed to tackle new infectious diseases 
threats posed by novel viruses that can cause fatal respiratory tract infections over the 
past decade and to fi ll major gaps that remain in the understanding of their 
epidemiology and transmission dynamics. 
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authorities worldwide.3 Almost all confi rmed cases 
were reported from the Middle East, notably Saudi 
Arabia, but also neighboring countries including Egypt, 
Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen. According to the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC), cases have been reported in Algeria, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, 
Philippines, Tunisia, the UK, and the USA. Overall, all 
cases originated from or had a history of travel to the 
Middle East, with few secondary cases.3
Most cases of MERS-CoV infection have been in Saudi 
Arabia where the Hajj, a large religious mass gathering, 
takes place each year. The Hajj draws 2–3 million 
pilgrims from within Saudi Arabia and around the world. 
Worldwide attention has focused on the potential spread 
of MERS-CoV after the Hajj pilgrimage because pilgrims 
have a high risk of respiratory tract infections because of 
crowded conditions.4 In 2013, the Saudi Ministry of 
Health recommended that elderly people (older than 
65 years), people with chronic diseases (eg, heart disease, 
kidney disease, respiratory disease, and diabetes), the 
immunocompromised (congenital and acquired), people 
with malignant disease or terminal illnesses, pregnant 
women, and children (age less than 12 years) postpone 
their participation in the Hajj and Umrah for their own 
safety.5 Investigations done among French pilgrims 
participating in the 2013 Hajj showed that 48% had at 
least one disorder for which the Saudi Ministry of Health 
recommends participation in the Hajj be postponed.6,7 
None of 179 individuals at risk decided to cancel 
participation, even after receiving this advice during 
consultation.6,7 All countries (particularly those with 
returning pilgrims) were advised by the International 
Health Regulations Emergency Committee to strengthen 
their surveillance capacities and ensure robust reporting 
of any identifi ed cases.8 Cohort surveys of returning 
French pilgrims with systematic screening of MERS-CoV 
nasal carriage by PCR were done in 2012 and 2013, and 
the results were negative despite high rates of respiratory 
symptoms.9,10 However, pilgrims rapidly acquired other 
respiratory viruses during their stay in Saudi Arabia 
(especially rhinovirus and infl uenza viruses, which 
emphasises the potential of these infections to spread in 
the pilgrims’ home countries on their return.10,11 
Screening of pilgrims from 22 countries before 
(3210 pilgrims) and after (2025) Hajj in 2013 did not 
reveal any positive cases by RT-PCR.12
Between human transmission of MERS-CoV
Most MERS-CoV cases reported have probably acquired 
infection through human-to-human transmission. 
Among 144 confi rmed and 17 probable cases analysed by 
the MERS-CoV Research Group in November, 2013, 
95 (59%) were classifi ed as secondary cases with epi-
demiological links to other confi rmed cases. Among 
these, most acquired the infection in health-care 
settings (63·2%), followed by those infected in 
household settings (13·7%).13 In the same report, 
clusters of cases secondary to human-to-human trans-
mission occurred with a cluster size ranging from two 
to 25 patients. The largest cluster was in Al-Hasa 
Figure: Geographical distribution of human cases of emerging respiratory viruses
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(Saudi Arabia) with 25 cases among patients undergoing 
hemodialysis, visiting family members, and health-care 
workers.14 However, a description of the geographical 
distribution and phylogenetic relation of MERS-CoV 
infections across time suggests that the Al-Hasa hospital 
outbreak might have been caused by more than one 
virus introduction.15 Other clusters in the health-care 
setting have been described in France, Jordan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and UAE.13 Several clusters have been 
described in the context of the household setting in 
Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, or in both the contexts of 
health-care and household settings in the UK.13,16,17 
Transmission in all reported clusters is restricted, and 
evidence from contact-tracing suggests that trans-
mission did not extend beyond close contacts into the 
community. Assessment of the between-human 
transmissibility of MERS-CoV by two teams with 
available non-hospital epidemiological data confi rmed 
the restricted pattern of transmission. The estimated R0 
was 0·60–0·69 in one study and 0·8–1·3 in another 
(table 1).18,19 In the absence of appropriate hospital 
infection control, R0 might be greater than 1 in hospitals 
admitting patients with MERS-CoV.
Evidence for a zoonotic source for MERS-CoV
MERS-CoV belongs to the lineage C βcoronaviruses, 
which are associated with bats.20 Close relatives of MERS-
CoV have been identifi ed in European, Asian, Central 
American, and South African bats.21–27 A new β-corona-
virus related to MERS-CoV has also been charac terised in 
European hedgehogs.28 The genome diversity of human 
MERS-CoV isolates suggests that human infections 
result from several independent zoonotic events from an 
unknown reservoir in the Middle East.15,29 Among 
161 patients with MERS-CoV analysed by the MERS-CoV 
Research Group in November, 2013, 51 (32%) were 
classifi ed as probably sporadic (table 2) or index cases (no 
exposure to other known cases). Contact of patients with 
camels was documented in only fi ve of 51 cases; however, 
reliable information was available from only 28 cases.13 
MERS-CoV spike-protein-binding anti bodies and virus 
neutralising antibodies are reported in high proportions 
of camels from the Canary Islands, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, but not from other livestock 
including sheep, goats, cattle, and chickens.30–37 A higher 
seroprevalence was reported in adults than in juvenile 
camels.33,36 Furthermore, MERS-CoV was detected by 
quantitative (q) RT-PCR from nasal samples in 11 of 
14 camels from a farm in Qatar linked to two confi rmed 
human cases, fi ve of 76 camels from Oman, 36 of 
104 juvenile camels from Saudi Arabia, 15 of 98 adult 
camels from Saudi Arabia, and four of 110 camels from 
Egypt, two of which were imported from Sudan and 
Ethiopia.31,33,38,39 Genomic sequences of MERS-CoV 
isolates from two patients and from their infected camels 
were almost identical, suggesting camel-to-human trans-
mission.40,41 
A novel coronavirus (DcCoV UAE-HKU23) was 
detected by qRT-PCR in 21% of faecal samples from 
dromedary calves in UAE. 97–100% of camels were 
positive for MERS-CoV antibody testing by various 
methods, whereas 52% only had antibodies against 
DcCoV UAE-HKU23, which shows that little correlation 
exists between seropositivity to the two viruses.35 
Additionally, a gene fragment was recovered from a 
faecal sample from a bat in Saudi Arabia, near the home 
of a confi rmed human case; bat and human isolates were 
100% homologous.42 Studies addressing the sero-
prevalence of MERS-CoV among human beings are 
highly demanding from a technical perspective, because 
titres are generally low, and there is crossreactivity 
between coronaviruses.43 
Studies done on 624 serum specimens from people in 
Saudi Arabia, including slaughterhouse workers, by 
discriminative methods failed to show evidence for the 
presence of antibodies.43,44 Dromedary camels harbour 
the virus and shed MERS-CoV in respiratory secretions. 
The frequency of positive serology in camels versus 
human beings strongly suggests that camels are the 
reservoir for human exposure. Unpasteurised camel 
Total human 
cases
Total human 
deaths
Clusters Environmental 
properties
R0
MERS-CoV* 841 327 Family and 
health-care 
settings
Stable at low 
temperature and 
low humidity
0·60–0·69 vs 
0·8–1·3
Human 
adenovirus 14p1
Many 13 Military and 
school settings
Unknown Unknown
H7N9 avian 
infl uenza virus
448 157 Family settings Survives for 
months in the 
environment
0·11–0·45
H10N8 avian 
infl uenza virus
3 1 None Water persistence Unknown
H3N2 variant 
infl uenza virus
340 1 Geriatric ward 
settings
·· Unknown
MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. *Data to end of July, 2014. 
Table 1: Emerging respiratory viruses as of June, 2014
Potential sources Transmission patterns
Middle East 
respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus
Human patients, camels, bats, and 
environment (camel farms)
Human-to-human (59%), sporadic
Human adenovirus 
14p1
Human patients and asymptomatic 
shedders
Sporadic, human-to-human (close and 
frequent contact)
H7N9 avian infl uenza 
virus
Live birds, poultry, environment (bird 
markets, poultry farms, wet markets — soil 
and surface waters), and human patients
Direct contact with live poultry, human-
to-human (possible but restricted and 
non-sustainable)
H10N8 avian 
infl uenza virus
Live birds and poultry, environment (soil 
and surface water)
Exposure to poultry
H3N2 variant 
infl uenza virus
Pigs, pig environments (agriculture fairs), 
and human patients
Direct or indirect contact with pigs, 
human-to-human (possible but 
restricted and non-sustainable)
 Table 2: Potential sources and transmission patterns of emerging respiratory viruses
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milk is a possible route of trans mission, but so far few 
studies have assessed the prevalence of MERS-CoV in 
camel milk. A study in April, 2014 showed that camel 
milk was positive for MERS-CoV by qRT-PCR.45 Finally, 
the reservoirs might have complex ecology, and bats 
might play a part.
Evidence for environmental source for MERS-CoV
Only one study has investigated the stability of MERS-
CoV under diff erent environmental conditions.46 MERS-
CoV was stable at low temperatures and low humidity 
and could be recovered after 48 h at 20°C and 40% relative 
humidity. Aerosolisation of MERS-CoV did not aff ect its 
stability. These data show the potential for MERS-CoV to 
be transmitted via contact or fomite transmission as a 
result of prolonged environmental presence.
Putative mode of transmission of MERS-CoV
The exact mode of transmission of MERS-CoV is 
unknown. However, several MERS-CoV clusters have 
implicated human-to-human transmission among health-
care worker, hospital inpatient, and family cluster case 
series.47 Such transmission could be through respiratory 
droplets or direct or indirect contact.48 With a model 
developed by measurement of the hardness of coronavirus 
inner and outer protein shells, MERS-CoV was predicted 
to be readily transmitted through an oral–faecal route and 
also possibly via respiratory secretions.49
Human adenovirus 14
Geographical distribution
HAdDV-14 was fi rst discovered in 1955 during an 
outbreak of acute respiratory infections among military 
trainees in the Netherlands.50 Soon after, other 
outbreaks were reported in Czechoslovakia, England, 
and Uzbekistan (fi gure).51–54 The circulation and case 
reports of HAdV-14 infections ceased during the early 
1960s until the beginning of the 1970s when the virus 
was again detected in the Netherlands.53 In the early 
part of this century, suspected cases of HAdV-14 were 
identifi ed in Taiwan.55 During 2006, a variant of 
HAdV-14 (later dubbed HAdV-14p1) caused epidemics 
among US military trainees in fi ve states: California, 
Georgia, Illinois, Montana, and Texas.53,56,57 From 2003 
until now, sporadic HAdV-14p1 cases and clusters of 
cases were also described among civilians throughout 
the USA (Alaska, California, Kansas, New York, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin)53,58–61 In 2009–10, 
nine sporadic cases were reported in Ireland.61 In 
October 2010, HAdV-14p1 was detected by culture in a 
17-month-old child with tonsillitis living in Guangzhou, 
southern China.62 In December 2010, HAdV-14p1 was 
isolated from a 6-month-old child presenting with 
pneumonia in Beijing, China.63 In April 2011, an 
outbreak occurred aff ecting 43 children (8–15 years old) 
attending school in the Tongwei County of the Gansu 
province (northwestern China), of whom 11 were 
identifi ed with infection of HAdV-14p1.64 During summer 
2011, three sporadic epidemiologically unrelated HAdV-
14p1 cases were identifi ed in the Canadian province of 
New Brunswick.65
Between-human transmission of HAdV-14p1
HAdVs are chiefl y transmitted via direct contact, aerosol, 
or contact with fomites. HAdV-14 strains are pre-
dominantly associated with upper and lower respiratory 
infections, and hence respiratory secretions are infec-
tious. Adenoviruses are ubiquitous in military training 
facilities.66 People at risk of HAdV-14p1 infection include 
military trainees, young children, and the immuno-
compromised (table 1). During HAdV outbreaks, the 
high prevalence of asymptomatic infected individuals 
renders the surveillance and targeted countermeasures 
very diffi  cult to enforce (table 2). So far, the basic 
reproductive rate (R0) has not been estimated for 
HAdV-14p1.
Evidence for a zoonotic source for HAdV-14p1
Cross-species transmission of a simian adenovirus from 
monkeys to man has been documented with scarce 
human-to-human infection.67,68 HAdV-14 strains are 
human adenovirus B (mastadenoviruses of the family 
Adenoviridae); all other adenovirus B are human viruses 
(HAdV-3, 7, 11, 16, 21, 34, 35, 50) except for the simian 
adenovirus 21.69 Most of the simian adenoviruses isolated 
from non-human primates are phylogenetically related 
to human adenoviruses and belong to the species B, C, 
and E.70 However, there are no observational data to 
suggest that human HAdV-14p1 infections might be 
epidemiologically linked to contact with non-human 
primates. There is no evidence that HAdV-14p1 is 
zoonotic.
Evidence for environmental sources of HAdV-14p1
No specifi c data for HAdV-14p1 suggest either an 
environmental reservoir or an environmental source of 
infection. However, other human adenoviruses are stable 
in the environment, and HAdV-B14p1 probably has 
similar characteristics. The infectivity of masta deno-
viruses is suppressed after 10 min at 56°C or above; they 
are infectious when frozen, stable when exposed to mild 
acids, and insensitive to lipid solvents.69
Putative mode of transmission of HAdV-14
No study is specifi cally dedicated to the transmissions of 
HAdV-14p1; however, this virus is probably transmitted 
through mechanisms similar to those recorded for other 
human adenoviruses that cause respiratory tract 
infections. Adenoviruses frequently cause epidemics 
among military trainees, children (especially newborns), 
institutionalised people in hospitals and nursing homes, 
and immunocompromised people.71–74 Because of their 
innate nature, adenoviruses are hardy and resistant to 
www.thelancet.com/infection   Vol 14   November 2014 1117
Series
environmental changes; they can be transmitted directly 
from person to person, and indirectly from environment 
to person.69 For HAdV-14p1, the substantial proportion of 
epidemic episodes that occurred in a community (eg, 
schools and military camps) suggests that close proximity 
is a key factor for outbreaks.53
Avian infl uenza H7N9 virus
Geographical distribution
The outbreak of a human novel infl uenza A H7N9 virus 
infection that occurred in early 2013 in eastern China 
(fi gure) raised serious concerns among public health 
professionals about the possibility of an imminent 
infl uenza pandemic.75,76 As of June, 2014, more than 
440 laboratory-confi rmed cases and more than 150 deaths 
from infl uenza A H7N9 have occurred.77 Novel infl uenza 
A H7N9 spread rapidly, involving numerous provinces in 
China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Taiwan.76,78 Infl uenza A 
H7N9 virus infections are associated with fever, chills, 
shivering, cough, chest pain, dyspnoea, nausea and 
vomiting,79 lymphocytopenia, leucopenia,80 hyperpyrexia, 
respiratory failure, acute respiratory distress syndrome, 
multiorgan failure,81 fulminant pneumonia, septic shock, 
rhabdomyolysis, and encephalopathy.82
Between-human transmission
The poorly understood pathogenesis and unknown 
mode of transmission of H7N9,83 coupled with the 
absence of mass deaths in poultry and wild birds before 
disease outbreaks makes public health intervention 
measures diffi  cult to implement.84 The risk of human-
to-human transmission of infl uenza A H7N9 is contro-
versial since cases of family clustering could be a result 
of between-human transmission or a result of common 
exposure to infected poultry or other environ mental 
risk factors.85 Some researchers argue that routes of 
human infections are only through exposure to poultry, 
wild birds, or via avian environmental exposures.75 They 
claim that between-human trans mission is unlikely 
since many close contacts of con fi rmed H7N9 cases did 
not have evidence for infl uenza A H7N9 infection.80 
Supporters of the bird-exposure hypothesis also argue 
that the reduction in human H7N9 cases after the 
April 2013 closure of live poultry and bird markets 
supports their view.86 Furthermore, they argue that 
recorded family clustering can be explained as a result 
of common exposure to birds or their environments 
and not as a result of human-to-human transmission.79 
Some researchers also used mathematical models to 
suggest that the reproduction number for human-to-
human trans mission of the novel infl uenza A H7N9 is 
well below unity87 Other researchers argue that there is 
a strong possibility of restricted and non-sustainable 
H7N9 human-to-human transmission.81 They argue 
that a confi rmed case, without exposure to live birds or 
live poultry markets, developed the disease and died of 
multiorgan failure after taking care of a confi rmed sick 
close relative who also died of the disease, with the 
genome sequencing of the viruses isolated from the 
two patients being almost identical.81 A case-control 
study also excluded a participant from the study on the 
grounds of being infected with a possible human-to-
human transmission.88 Another study showed that 
some close relatives of confi rmed cases developed 
respiratory symptoms but did not give positive results 
for infl uenza A H7N9 virus, thereby stating that, 
although low, the risk of human-to-human transmission 
is still a possibility.89
Evidence for a zoonotic source
Exposure to infected poultry seems to be the major 
cause of human infection with infl uenza A H7N9 
(table 2)75,76,87 because of the strong similarity between 
infl uenza A H7N9 isolates detected among human 
beings and poultry.80 Almost all cases had either a direct 
contact with live poultry89 or were exposed to environ-
mental sources such as live bird markets, poultry 
farms, and wet markets where live birds are slaughtered 
and processed.75,76,79 Most outbreaks occurred in 
provinces along the eastern Asian–Australian fl yway, 
along which migratory birds travel, fl ying over areas 
with densely populated poultry farms, live bird markets, 
rice farms, and free grazing ducks.84,90,91 Infl uenza A 
H7N9 viruses have been isolated from chickens and 
pigeons in markets in some of the aff ected provinces,79,80 
and from poultry cages and faeces in some live poultry 
and bird markets in the provinces.88
Evidence for an environmental source
Environmental factors have important roles in the onset 
and maintenance of H7N9 outbreaks.90 Many of the 
confi rmed cases had occupational exposures such as 
being a poultry worker, slaughtering birds in wet poultry 
markets, or visiting or purchasing live birds or poultry 
from live bird markets.76,85,89 Environmental samples in 
live poultry markets yielded positive results for the novel 
infl uenza H7N9 virus,76 which was also isolated from 
contaminated soils and surface water90 and from the 
immediate environment of a confi rmed case.76 H7N9 can 
survive for months in the environment thereby leading 
to risk of infections to poultry or human beings long 
after initial detection (table 1).76,90 Since the closure of live 
bird markets, which create environments allowing 
prolonged and repeated exposure of live birds and people 
(thereby increasing the risk of disease outbreaks), there 
has been a substantial decrease in the number of human 
cases of H7N9 in the aff ected regions.92
Putative modes of transmission
The transmissibility and pathogenesis of the novel 
infl uenza A H7N9 are still poorly understood,76 but direct 
contact to host agents and exposure to environmental 
risk factors seem to be the generally approved means of 
transmission to human beings.90 Bird-to-human route, 
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poultry-to-human route, and exposure to environmental 
risk factors are probably the major causes of human 
infection with the novel infl uenza A H7N9,75,76,79 though 
some researchers believe that human-to-human trans-
mission is thus far non-sustainable.
Avian infl uenza H10N8
Geographical distribution
In December, 2013, WHO reported the fi rst human case 
of avian infl uenza A H10N8 virus in China (fi gure),93,94 
but the virus was fi rst isolated from birds in Italy in 
1965.95 Though usually without clinical signs in birds,96 
H10N8 has been isolated in both North America and 
Asia.95 All three human cases (including one death) were 
detected in Nanchang City, Jiangxi Province, China.93,94 
Signs and symptoms are consistent with other infl uenza-
like illnesses and include chills,93,94 cough, chest pain, 
shivering, pneumonia, respiratory failure, acute respira-
tory distress syndrome, and multiorgan failure.79,82,94 
Despite the few human cases,92 these H10N8 infections 
are a cause for concern because this is the fi rst H10N8 
infl uenza virus to aff ect human beings. 95
Between-human transmission
The small number of human cases of illness caused by 
infl uenza A H10N8 infection94 and absence of adequate 
information with respect to the reported human cases95 
have made it diffi  cult to fully understand the transmission 
potential of infl uenza A H10N8 virus. So far, there is no 
evidence of between-human transmission of infl uenza A 
H10N8 virus because close contacts of the cases have not 
yet developed infl uenza A H10N8 infection.93
Evidence for a zoonotic source
Evidence points to zoonotic sources as the major cause of 
infection with infl uenza A H10N8 virus. All three human 
cases had live bird market exposures (table 2).94,96 Avian 
sources seem to be the major reservoir for H10N8 since 
the viruses are believed to be circulating without clinical 
signs among poultry and have been isolated from 
migratory species.95
Evidence for environmental source
Environmental factors seem to have key roles in 
maintaining the transmission of infl uenza A H10N8 
virus with persistence in water being particularly 
important to transmission both among birds and to 
human beings.96 Infl uenza A H10N8 has been isolated 
from water samples from Dongting Lake in Hunan 
province China in 2007,96 and a live poultry market in 
southern China in 2012, thereby showing the importance 
of environmental factors in its transmission (table 1).
Putative modes of transmission
Since human-to-human transmission of infl uenza A 
H10N8 has not been documented,94 the avian-to-human 
route of transmission seems to be the main route of 
human infection.93 Despite being considered as having 
low or non-pathogenicity in avian species,96 the small 
number of patients might make it diffi  cult to know the 
actual virulence of infl uenza A H10N8 virus in people.93 
Studies suggest that nucleotide changes or substitution 
can increase the transmissibility of the virus in human 
beings,95 since wild strains that were non-pathogenic in 
mice later caused weight loss and death in mice after two 
lung passages;96 and genetic analysis of all infl uenza A 
H10N8 isolates obtained from the NCBI Infl uenza Virus 
Resource Database showed the presence of genetic 
markers that favour mammalian adaptation or increased 
virulence in mammals.95
Infl uenza A H3N2 virus
Geographical distribution
Pig H3N2 virus is believed to have circulated among 
human beings since 1968,97 with more than 30 human 
cases reported from 2005 to June 2011 in the USA and 
Canada (fi gure).98–100 The emergence of a variant swine-
like infl uenza A H3N2 virus in July, 2011,101 however, 
alarmed public health offi  cials. The variant virus likely 
evolved from the 2009 pandemic infl uenza A H1N1,102 
many cases had direct or indirect exposure to pigs in 
agricultural fairs,98,99,103,104 and this virus seemingly has 
more pandemic potential than other swine-like viruses.105 
As of June 5, 2014, 340 laboratory-confi rmed cases of 
human infl uenza A H3N2 and one death have been 
documented in 13 US states.101,103,105–108 Additional cases of 
human infl uenza A H3N2 have been reported in various 
countries including Denmark,109 the UK,110 Italy,111 Hong 
Kong,112 France,100 Japan,113 Taiwan, and Singapore.114 
Disease symptoms are consistent with other infl uenza-
like symptoms, which include fever (temperature >38°C), 
sore throat, cough, rhinorrhoea, vomiting or diarrhoea, 
fatigue, myalgia or joint pain,103,115 headache, lethargy, 
rhinorrhoea, emesis, dyspnoea, and eye irritation.99,100
Between human transmission
Seroepidemiological studies suggest that roughly 90% of 
US children less than 10 years of age were susceptible to 
infl uenza A H3N2 infection.115–117 Although many studies 
suggest the occurrence of no or restricted and un-
sustainable human-to-human transmission of infl uenza 
A H3N2,98,113,118 some researchers believe there is every 
possibility of human-to-human trans mission.99–104,119 
Evidence includes an outbreak of infl uenza A H3N2 in 
three geriatric wards in France (table 1),100 a US daycare 
centre,99 and other US case series involving infected 
people without exposure to pigs.101,103
Evidence for a zoonotic source
Pig species are mixing bowls through which avian 
infl uenza viruses might mix with other infl uenza viruses 
and cross over to human beings (table 2).120 Many studies 
suggest that zoonotic sources had important roles in the 
outbreak of infl uenza A H3N2 since most confi rmed 
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human cases had direct or indirect exposure to pigs 
during agricultural fairs.99,100,104,105 Pig samples taken from 
agricultural fairs have tested positive for H3N2,97,121,122 and 
one study documented antigenic similarity between 
H3N2 taken from pigs in agricultural fairs and those 
associated with commercial pig farms,107 thereby showing 
the importance of pigs in the transmission and 
maintenance of H3N2 among human beings.
Evidence for an environmental source
The high rate of outbreaks of human infl uenza A H3N2 
among people that attended or exhibited at the 
agricultural fairs,98,99,103,104 suggests that there is a 
substantial association between disease outbreaks and 
physical location of individuals. Agricultural fairs are 
recognised as a potential place for pigs and human 
beings to share pathogens,98 thereby creating enabling 
environments for the re-assortment of pig and human 
viruses with the potential of generating novel viruses.118
Putative modes of transmission
The pig-to-human route is probably the main trans mission 
route for infl uenza A H3N2, whereas human-to-human 
transmission is likely a secondary mechanism.98,99,103,104 As a 
respiratory virus, common means of H3N2 transmission 
include direct contact, respiratory droplets, and aerosol 
particles from infected pigs or people. The acquisition of 
the matrix gene from the 2009 pandemic virus is believed 
to have caused infl uenza A H3N2 to be more virulent than 
the seasonal H3N2 strains.101
Conclusion
While HAdV-14p1 has been identifi ed in humans only, 
MERS-CoV, infl uenza A H7N9, infl uenza A H10N8, and 
infl uenza A H3N2 are zoonotic diseases. There is a 
mounting evidence suggesting that camels are the likely 
reservoir of human exposure to MERS-CoV. Infl uenza A 
H7N9 and infl uenza A H10N8 reservoirs consist of 
poultry, ducks, and wild birds. The infl uenza A H3N2 
reservoir consists of pigs. One possible way to prevent 
these zoonotic infections is avoiding direct contact with 
these animals or their dairy products in the respective 
areas of endemicity. It is advisable avoiding staying in 
environments where such animals are concentrated, 
including farms and markets. The absence of massive 
deaths and even of clinical signs among the reservoir 
animals leaves little or no time for public health 
preparations and intervention measures to curtail the 
impacts by culling. Given the possible interhuman 
transmission of these viruses (notably MERS-Cov and 
HAdV-14p1), the individual preventive measures aiming 
at reducing the risk of respiratory infections (use of face-
mask, hand hygiene, cough etiquette, social distancing) 
should be reinforced.
Because of the poor current knowledge of the specifi c 
pathogenesis and mode of transmission of HAdV-14p1, 
recommendations for control and preventive measures 
have to be extrapolated by reference to other human 
adenoviruses causing respiratory infections.123 For-
tunately, most HAdV-14p1 infections do not cause severe 
illness.124 Thus, direct methods to detect and identify 
HAdV-14p1, which have been recently described, will help 
to improve rapidly surveillance and diagnosis.125 The high 
mutation or reassortment rate of infl uenza viruses could 
lead to the emergence of more virulent and transmissible 
strains.76,126 The identifi cation of several novel viruses that 
can cause fatal respiratory tract infections over the past 
decade, and major gaps that remain in the understanding 
of their epidemiology and transmission dynamics, calls 
for a more united and coordinated global response for 
tackling new infectious diseases threats.
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